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Abstract:
Unions have lost the once strong position they held in the American workplace. Academics
have long debated how to restore the National Labor Relations Act’s relevance in today’s global
marketplace. Congress’s preferred solution seems to be the Employee Free Choice Act, which would
reform the unionization voting process, but this proposal does not strike at the heart of the matter.
Labor is losing the debate on the benefits of unionization for the average worker because it is
operating on an uneven playing field where employers can exert undue influence on employees to
prevent them from organizing, with no real opportunity for nonemployee union representatives to
respond.
True reform must focus on the ability of union representatives to access employer property,
which is currently governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lechmere v. NLRB.1 Recognizing
the importance of access to employer property, Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has recently proposed changes
to the Lechmere test that would eliminate consideration of state law from the analysis.2 However,
rather than protest its consideration, Labor should embrace state property law as an answer to the
access dilemma. In order to support this claim, this article presents a unique analysis of the different
ways in which state property law can provide a means for nonemployees to access private property.
Thus, the article concludes with a proposal to reform the Lechmere analysis by emphasizing state
property law, and also calls for Congress to eliminate discrimination against Labor viewpoints in
employers’ decisions to open their property to nonemployees.
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Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 46 B.C. L. REV. 891 (2006).
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INTRODUCTION

America’s workforce is struggling to make ends meet more than ever before,
but politicians are ignoring a possible solution. The end of 2009 saw the official
unemployment rate close in double digits at 10%.3 Through the better part of 2010,
the jobless rate remains in a dire situation.4 The job market is so bad that some have
likened obtaining employment to getting into Harvard.5 Further, American families
are earning less today than they were a decade ago.6 Proponents of unions and
organized labor (“Labor” or “Labor advocates”) believe an answer to many of these
problems lies in one of our country’s oldest federal laws, the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”).7 This viewpoint advocates that unions can
help employees by providing job security and increased wages. So why are union
membership rates not higher? Many labor experts debate the cause of dwindling
union membership and find numerous reasons to explain the decline.8 These
commentators also propose solutions that suggest the need to internally reform
union structures or externally change the rules governing union representation.9
Congress, for its part, is spending valuable political capital on a contentious

3

Peter S. Goodman, U.S. Job Losses in December Dim Hopes for Quick Upswing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9 2010.

4

Catherine Rampell, Public Jobs Drop Amid Slowdown in Private Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010
(through September 2010, the unemployment rate was 9.6%).

5

Samuel Sherraden, Landing a Job Like Getting into Harvard, CNN, Nov. 6, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/11/06/stimulus.jobs/index.html.

6David

Leonhardt, A Decade With No Income Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/a-decade-with-no-income-gain
(citing
U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2008 (Sept. 2009)).

7

29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

8

See infra Part II(A).

9

See infra Part II(A).
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modification to labor law in the Employee Free Choice Act (the “EFCA”).10
The solution to Labor’s dilemma must target reforming nonemployee union
representative access to employer property. The controlling analysis from the
Supreme Court’s watershed opinion in Lechmere v. NLRB grants nonemployee union
representatives few rights to access employer property.11 The conflict between
employee rights to organize and join a union under § 7 of the Act12 and private
property rights to exclude other individuals is resolved heavily in favor of the
employer.13 To bring balance to the union debate, this article will argue that
Congress and the Supreme Court should grant nonemployee union representatives
fair access to employer property.
The recent opinion in Fremont-Rideout presents a new threat to the capacity of
employees to exercise their § 7 rights under the Act.14 This article is the first to
consider the impact of this 2009 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision,
pending before the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”), on nonemployee
access rights to employer property. The Fremont-Rideout ruling extended the NLRB’s
Register-Guard15 discrimination analysis to real property.16 This interpretation of the
Act means that an employer unlawfully denies nonemployees access to its property
only where the employer provides disparate access privileges between unions,
without regard to how the employer treats solicitations by non-labor organizations.17
For those concerned about the continuing vitality of the Act, this standard threatens
to further reduce the already diminished presence of unions in the American
workforce.
In a leading treatment of this topic before Fremont-Rideout, Professor Jeffrey
Hirsch argued the NLRB should adopt a new standard that disregards state property

10

See infra Part II(D).

11

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).

12

29 U.S.C. § 157(commonly referred to as § 7).

13

See Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527.

14

The Fremont-Rideout Health Group (Fremont-Rideout), 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20 (N.L.R.B. Jan.
29, 2009).

15

The Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).

16

See Fremont-Rideout, 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20.

17

Id at *8-13.
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rights to restore equality for union viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas.18
Although Hirsch presents a novel approach to enhance union access to employer
property, two critical flaws in his proposal suggest the need for a better solution.
First, Hirsch trades a concrete, objective basis for recognizing rights for a test that
depends on each party’s subjective version of events. Second, Hirsch complicates
the dispute resolution process for the parties by requiring them to concurrently
litigate two separate lines of cases. In one action, union advocates must litigate
before the NLRB against a property owner to enforce § 7 rights under the Act. At
the same time, the parties must engage in a trespass action before state courts to
determine the extent of property access rights.
Rather than dispose of state property law in the NLRB’s analysis, Labor
should embrace the potential to influence access rights for nonemployee union
representatives through state property law. This article presents a unique
contribution to the nonemployee-access discussion by analyzing the different types
of state law that Labor can rely on to provide a nonemployee union representative
with access to employer property. State constitutions, statutes and regulations, and
common law all afford individuals the right to access private property. Therefore,
state property law presents an answer to Labor’s problems.
In light of the weaknesses of Hirsch’s standard and the advantages of a
solution based on state law, I propose a different approach for Labor advocates to
improve access rights to private property and restore employees’ § 7 rights. The
Supreme Court must revisit the Lechmere analysis to ensure that state property rights
control whether a nonemployee has access to employer property. Additionally,
Congress should restore free speech principles by ending discrimination against
union viewpoints. These measures would go far for Labor advocates seeking to
reintroduce equality to the union debate.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes unions in the United States
and efforts to revive their place in the national labor policy. Part III lays out the
current state of nonemployee access rights to employer property under the Act,
federal court precedent, and NLRB precedent. The discussion also includes analysis
of the Fremont-Rideout decision. Part IV describes Hirsch’s solution and explains why
Labor should embrace, rather than discount, state property law as a solution to the
diminishing presence of unions. In Part V, I propose a two-pronged solution for

18

See Hirsch, supra note 2.
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Labor to restore greater balance to union representative access rights. First, the
Supreme Court should return state property rights to the forefront of nonemployee
access rights to employer property. Second, I propose legislation in the form of the
Labor Rights Act of 2010 to end discrimination against labor viewpoints.
II.

THE DIRE SITUATION OF UNIONS IN AMERICA AND EFFORTS TO REVIVE
THEIR PRESENCE IN THE WORKPLACE

Labor unions traditionally enjoyed strong popularity in the United States, but
their membership is now at an all-time low. Congress is currently considering the
Employee Free Choice Act to return unions to the position of prominence they once
held in the United States.19 The EFCA, however, will not achieve the success Labor
advocates foresee. If union proponents want to see true reform, their efforts must
also enhance the rights of nonemployees to access employer property and help
employees exercise their § 7 rights under the Act.
A. Popularity That Does Not Match Practice
Labor advocates can present convincing arguments that union membership
has numerous benefits for the average worker.20 Federal reports show individuals
belonging to a union make around 20% more than their non-union counterparts.21
If the employee is a woman or African American, the salary discrepancy is closer to

19

H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).

20

In 1993, President Clinton’s administration formed the Dunlop Commission to investigate what
changes should be made to American labor law “to enhance work-place productivity” and
“cooperative behavior” and reduce collective bargaining conflicts. U.S. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 3 (1994).
Based on testimony, studies, and hearings presented to the Commission, the subsequent Dunlop
Commission Report found that “[t]he evidence presented to the Commission is overwhelming that
employee participation and labor-management partnerships are good for workers, firms, and the
national economy.” Id. at 4, 8.
21

U.S. Dept. of Labor, Median Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers by Union
Affiliation and Selected Characteristics, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.t02.htm. This statistic refers to the 2008 weekly salary of individuals ages 25 and up where a
union member made a weekly average of $903 while a non-union member made a weekly average of
$736. Id.
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30%.22 Union members are more likely to receive health benefits from their
employer than non members.23 Unions typically negotiate for “just cause” protection
of jobs so that an employee cannot be terminated “at will.”24 Additionally, unions
help secure other vital interests of employees.
In the wake of the financial collapse of the late 2000s, anti-union advocates
came out strongly to oppose increasing union membership in America. While the
union employee benefits from higher wages, labor costs are greater for employers
with a unionized workforce.25 To overcome the costs of unions, Labor critics claim,
employers must rely on more machines to do the work of employees or outsource
positions overseas.26 These alternatives result in fewer jobs for Americans out of
work. Related to costs are complaints that union workers are less efficient because
they know the union will always protect them from an employer’s attempt at
discipline.27 Further, union assailants argue that unions are prone to coerce potential
members and employers through violence and other acts of cruelty.28 Fueling such
allegations are reports of union supporters stabbing an employee who crossed the
picket line,29 burning nonunion housing camps,30 and withholding health insurance


22

Id. In 2008 a non-union woman, 25 or older, made $645 per week compared to her union-member
counterpart who made $825 per week. Additionally, a non-union African American aged 16 or older
made $564 per week compared to his or her union member counterpart who made $720 per week. Id.

23

Paul Fronstin, The Relationship Between Union Status and Employment-Based Health Benefits, 30 EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. NO. 10, 15-21 (Oct. 2009).
24

See United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Union
http://www.ufcw.org/about_ufcw/why_union/benefits.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).

Benefits,

25

Kevin Hassett, Manager’s Journal: Why Big Labor Keeps Getting Smaller, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1998, at
A14.

26

See id.

27

See EmployerReport, Lazy Union Workers ‘a Cancer’: Are Union Bosses Finally Getting It?,
http://employerreport.blogspot.com/2008/05/lazy-union-workers-cancer-are-union.html (May 19,
2008).

28

See Editorial, The Teamster Promise, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2003, at A20.

29

See Editorial, Union Casualties, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1997, at A18.

30

James Bovard, Union Goons’ Best Friend, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1994, at A14.
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from sick children.31
Despite these arguments, unions historically enjoyed broad support among
Americans. In the 1950s, unions had an approval rating around 75%.32 Although
membership rates are currently at their lowest point in American history,
approximately 59% of Americans approved of labor unions as recently as 2006.33
Public polling in the same year showed most Americans believed unions helped their
members (71%) and the U.S. economy in general (53%).34 Only in 2009 did unions
see their popularity among Americans dip below 50% for the first time, to 48%.35
This low percentage may well be a short-term effect of media coverage following the
financial collapse of the “Big Three” automakers in 2009.36 Still, unions continue to
enjoy a positive perspective from a significant percentage of Americans.
Although public support for unions remains near 50%, the percentage of
Americans who are union members barely hovers over 10% and is at its lowest point
in the history of the Act. In 2009, just 12.3% (or 15.3 million) of the total workforce
population (“total” includes both the private and public sectors) were union
members.37 By comparison, 20.1% (or 17.7 million) of the workforce population

31

Union Casualties, supra note 29, at A18. Allegedly the Teamsters cut off William West’s health
insurance, which was part of his union pension arrangement. West, whose daughter Callie suffered
from epilepsy and kidney problems, decided not to strike with his fellow UPS drivers.

32

Lydia Saad, Most Americans Approve of Labor Unions, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 1, 2006,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/24343/Most-Americans-Approve-Labor-Unions.aspx.
33

Id. In 2006, 59% of Americans approved of unions.

34

Id.

35

Lydia Saad, Labor Unions See Sharp Slide in U.S. Public Support, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 2009,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122744/Labor-Unions-Sharp-Slide-Public-Support.aspx#1. Thus, the
2009 results of Gallop’s poll may be a knee-jerk reaction by the public dealing with a struggling
economy rather than a true indicator of individual perceptions of labor unions.

36
37

Id.

U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union Members Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nr0.htm (Jan. 22, 2010).
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belonged to a union in 1983,38 24% (or 18 million) in 1973,39 and 28.3% in 1954.40
Additionally, the statistics are even lower for private sector employees. In 2009, just
7.2% of private sector employees were union members.41 This number compares to
37.4% of public sector employees that were union members in 2009.42 If Labor
advocates hope to bring the presence of unions into line with public support of
unions, the NLRB needs to embrace reform.43
B. Attempts to Explain and Solve the Union Membership Dilemma
Labor observers have long debated how to explain the downfall of union
membership.44 Samuel Estreicher classified the leading academic explanations of
Labor’s decline into four categories.45 First, the efforts of employers to oppose
unionization have generally succeeded in deterring supporters.46 Second, employees
themselves have shifted their attitudes from achieving goals through collective action
to individualism.47 Third, the structural changes of economies that focus on
providing services over manufacturing have left unions at a loss to maintain

38

Id.

39

Unionstats.com, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment Among All Wage and
Salary Workers, 1973-2009, http://unionstats.gsu.edu (follow “All Wage & Salary Workers” link
under “U.S. Historical Tables” heading) (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).

40

Gerald Mayer, Congressional Research Service, Union Membership Trends in the United States,
CRS-12 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/.

41

U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 37.

42

Id.

43

For a discussion on modern NLRB decisions that have contributed to its own downfall, see James
J. Brudney, The National Labor Relations Board in Comparative Context: Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s
Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221 (2005).

44

See Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in a World of Global Labor and
Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81(2009).

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 83. See also Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause
for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 134 (1998) (using survey and study data to
demonstrate that American workers’ traditional preferences for collective action have given way to
more recently favored individualism).
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membership counts.48 Finally, unions have not found a way to achieve their goals in
a global marketplace, instead driving individuals away from membership.49
No matter the source of the union membership problem, the academic
literature is rich with ways to increase the presence of unions in the 21st Century.50
Commentators recognizing the benefits that unions bring to the workplace propose
solutions focusing on either internal or external changes.51 Proponents of the
internal change viewpoint argue that unions need to change their structure, goals,
and methods to remain relevant.52 For example, Estreicher advocates for unions “to
reorient themselves in order to develop a package of services that appeals to mobile,
educated workers and that promotes worker voice without detriment to firm
economic performance.”53 Estreicher proposes that unions should take the firm’s
competitive position into greater consideration when promoting worker objectives
and begin to act as “career-based organizations,” to provide benefits for short-term
employees.54
Other commentators arguing for external changes suggest the decline of


48

Estreicher, supra note 44, at 83.

49

Id. Some of these traditional union goals included wage increases, shorter work weeks, and staffing
rules.

50

Margalioth, supra note 47, at 133-34 (Many theories explaining the decline of union membership
have been discussed. Some factors considered are competitive markets, employer resistance to
unions, structural change, and legal challenges).

51

See generally Estreicher, supra note 44 (Four primary explanations for the decline of union
memberships have emerged. Both institutional reforms and reevaluation of the goals and actions of
unions are required to increase trade union representation and participation).

52

See Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J.
103, 124 (2001) (proposing a two-tier representational system of collective bargaining). Arguably the
formation of the Change to Win coalition represents some unions acknowledging that new strategies
are necessary to reverse the trend of their decline. See Keith J. Gross, Separate to Unite: Will Change to
Win Strengthen Organized Labor in America, 24 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 75, 107-08 (2006).
53

Estreicher, supra note 44, at 91. But see Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform:
Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 829 (1996) (arguing for
deregulation of labor markets).

54

Estreicher, supra note 44, at 92.

2010]

LISTEN TO YOUR STATE

139

unionism in America is due to Congress’ failure to modernize labor laws.55 This view
starts with the understanding that employees potentially subject to a representation
election are basing their decision on imperfect information, which leads to
unbalanced results.56 Thus, labor laws and precedent must change so that employees
hear information from both sides of the debate and are able to make a more
educated decision.57 These proposed changes to laws include ending captive
audience meetings,58 applying the Act liberally to internet communications in the
workplace,59 and allowing easier access to employee contact information.60
C. Face-to-Face Communication Versus Internet Communication
To address imperfect information concerns, communication through the
Internet can provide a significant means of reaching potential union members where
face-to-face communication is not possible. Even today, after almost three decades

55

See The Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman and Walsh
dissenting) (critiquing the Majority’s opinion for turning the NLRB into the “Rip Van Winkle of
administrative agencies” for failing to keep up with changing technology while analyzing e-mail
systems) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).

56 See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 4569 (2008) (arguing for union representation decisions to be viewed as an economic decision rather
than as a “scientific laboratory” or a “political decision,” as traditionally believed).
57

Id. at 78.

58

A captive audience meeting is where an employer requires employees to attend a meeting during
working hours so the employer may espouse their views on unions. As this paper later discusses,
unions do not enjoy similar privileges to address any employer arguments. See generally Paul M.
Secunda, The Captive Audience: United States: Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008)
(discussing the risk in Worker Freedom Acts designed to end captive audience meetings and arguing
such laws should not be preempted by federal law).
59

See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262,
278-303 (2008) (applying NLRA rights and precedent to employee internet use at work, nonemployee
internet use, and electronic access to employees); see also Christine Neylon O’Brien, Employees on Guard:
Employer Policies Restrict NLRA-Protected Concerted Activities on E-mail, 88 OR. L. REV. 195, 249-50 (2009)
(advocating to apply a disparate impact analysis to employer prohibitions of work e-mail uses by
employees).
60

Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, Labor Law Access Rules and Stare Decisis: Developing a Planned
Parenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 138, 181 (1999) (arguing that unions
should be able to obtain the names and addresses for all employees from an employer upon showing
that 10% of employees are interested in union representation).
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since the birth of the modern Internet in 1983,61 Internet use continues to grow at an
astounding rate.62 Approximately 75% of all homes have a computer with access to
the Internet.63 Americans are also connected to the Internet at a higher speed than
ever before, with 57% of American homes accessing high-speed connections.64
Currently, federal efforts are underway to see these numbers expand even more, with
$7.2 billion in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 grants and loans
dedicated to bringing high-speed internet to rural communities.65
Despite widespread access to the Internet, physical face-to-face contact
remains Labor advocates’ preferred means of communicating between unions and
potential members for three reasons. First, while the Internet is widely available, its
actual use falls dramatically among those with lower education and income levels.66
For example, an individual making between $15,000-$25,000 is less than half as likely
to use the Internet as an individual making over $75,000.67 Further, an individual
who has completed college is approximately six times as likely to use the Internet as
one who did not graduate from high school.68 However, individuals in lower
income, lower educated classes are the types of individuals that unions are most
likely to recruit because union representation has the most to offer in increasing
wages, benefits, and job protections.69
Second, while most people have access to the Internet through public or

61

ROBERT KLOTZ, THE POLITICS OF INTERNET COMMUNICATION 9 (2004).

62

Id. at 30.

63

The Nielsen Company, An Overview of Home Internet Access in the U.S. 1, Dec. 2008,
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/overview-of-home-internetaccess-in-the-us-jan-6.pdf.
64

Id.

65

Press Release, Office of the Vice President, Vice President Biden Kicks Off $7.2 Billion Recovery
Act Broadband Program (Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with the author).

66

See KLOTZ, supra note 61, at 22.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69 See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook concurring)
(finding the Fair Labor Standards Act protects migrant workers as “employees” because their lack of
human capital makes those workers the type of employees that Congress intended the Fair Labor
Standards Act to protect).
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private sources, individuals may not find information online about unions to the
extent they could with face-to-face interaction. The three most common online
activities rank in order as e-mail, entertainment, and commerce.70Not until the fourth
most common online activity does one see political activity.71 Moreover, if a union
election campaign is analogized to a political election campaign, Internet use likely
offers a low rate of accidental exposure to union information.72
Undeniably, the Internet has the power to connect and mobilize individuals
with shared interests. In fact, a recent survey showed that 84% of Internet users
“engage in some group activity.”73 However, involvement in online “group activity”
does not necessarily translate into mobilized political action. Internet users are
unlikely to stumble on a given website without intentionally seeking it out, which
makes it difficult for unions to reach unknowing, uneducated, or undecided
individuals and convince them of the benefits of union membership.74
Finally, face-to-face contact with individuals is likely to result in higher
interest to vote on representation by a union than interest that the Internet alone can
garner. Studies examining whether face-to-face contact increases voter turnout in a
political election show that a potential voter who is contacted face-to-face by a
canvasser is significantly more likely to go to the polls than an individual who is not
contacted.75 Presumably, a similar analysis would apply to the context of union
elections. Nonemployee representatives seek to discuss the benefits of union
membership with employees who can petition to vote on the matter of organization,
and considering studies on the effects of face-to-face contact on voter turnout, union
representatives may be more successful in portraying the benefits of union
membership when addressing employees in person, rather than merely supplying

70

KLOTZ, supra note 61, at 32.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 64.

73

Id. at 42.

74

See id.

75

David Niven, The Mobilization Solution? Face-to-Face Contact and Voter Turnout in a Municipal Election, 66
J. POLS. 868, 875-76 (2004). See also Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, Does Canvassing Increase Voter
Turnout? A Field Experiment, 96 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 10939, 10941-42 (1999) (“[T]he
magnitude of the canvassing effect we observe lends credence to the thesis . . . that falling rates of
voter turnout reflect a decline in grass-roots political activity.”).
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information online. Thus, while the amount of information available on the Internet
to individuals is extensive, the above studies suggest that face-to-face interaction
uniquely spurs interest in seeking out that information.
D. Current Congressional NLRA Reform Efforts Focus on the Employee Free Choice Act
The most recent Congressional effort to reform the Act and expand union
membership in the United States is the Employee Free Choice Act.76 The EFCA, in
its proposed form, makes it easier to recognize a union as the official collective
bargaining representative of employees.77 Instead of holding a secret-ballot election
after employees present a petition for recognition, the EFCA allows a union to
become certified as the official bargaining representative when “a majority of
employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations
designating the individual or labor organization . . . as their bargaining
representative.”78 Thus, the EFCA limits the potential for undue influence that
employers can have over any vote between the time when a vote date is announced
and when the vote is held,79 like employers’ use of captive audience meetings.80
While the EFCA takes progressive steps to revitalize America’s union
movement, pro-union advocates may not realize the dramatic gains in union
membership they expect if the EFCA is implemented in its current form. The
EFCA does not include language dedicated to strengthening the ability of union
proponents to educate potential employee members of the advantages of joining a
union. Although one way to increase union membership is to make certifying a
union as the bargaining representative of employees an easier process, reform efforts
aimed at increasing union membership must make sure relevant individuals are able
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H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).

77

See id.

78

Id. at § 2.
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American
Rights
at
Work,
Why
Workers
Want
Majority
Sign-Up,
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/why_workers_want_majority
_sign-up.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations, The System for Forming Unions is Broken, http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/
voiceatwork/efca/brokensystem.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Employee Free Choice Act Questions and Answers,
http://www.uaw.org/efca/facts/030609FACTSQA.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
80

See Secunda, supra note 58.
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to learn the impact that union representation has on their employment conditions.
The best source of positive information about unions is union
representatives.81 Unions train representatives to understand and communicate the
advantages and benefits employees can expect from membership.82 When these
trained individuals are able to access employer property and discuss why employees
should be organized, the nonemployee union representative is able to directly
respond to questions and concerns an employer has about unions. A discussion
between a nonemployee union representative and an employee can include
addressing any allegations an employer may have made regarding union
representation at the place of employment during a captive audience meeting. This
interaction can provide a more personalized experience for the employee, who is
then able to make a better educated decision about whether they want to be
represented by a union. However, the current judicial analysis for nonemployee
union representatives to gain access to employer property favors an employer’s
ability to exclude such individuals from the employer’s property.83 If Labor
advocates want to see true reform, their efforts should focus on changing this
analysis to allow nonemployee union representatives reasonable access to employer
property.84
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One only needs to visit the websites of the leading union organizations to see the strength of union
advocacy efforts in action. For example, see the UAW Home Page, http://www.uaw.org; AFL-CIO
Home Page, http://www.aflcio.org; and SEIU Home Page, http://www.seiu.org.
82

For example, the National Labor College in Silver Spring, Maryland is an accredited higher
education institution devoted to strengthening member education and organizing skills. National
Labor College, Who We Are, http://www.nlc.edu/about/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).

83
84

See infra Part III.

Some efforts to increase nonemployee access to employees on employer property are taking shape.
In September of 2009, Sen. Arlen Specter announced several compromises discussed on EFCA to
guarantee it passes. Alec MacGillis, Specter Unveils Revised EFCA Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitol-briefing/2009/09/specter_unveils_prospective_de.html.
The proposed changes include “guarantee[ing] access to workers if employers h[o]ld mandatory antiunion meetings on company time.” This proposal is a direct response to captive audience meetings
discussed in note 58. While such provisions are better than nothing, more should be done.
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THE ANALYSIS REGARDING NONEMPLOYEE ACCESS RIGHTS TO EMPLOYER
PROPERTY

The NLRB first considered the right of nonemployees to gain access to
employer property over fifty years ago. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,85 the
Supreme Court confirmed a longstanding policy requiring the NLRB to
accommodate § 7 rights and private property rights “with as little destruction of one
as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”86 An employer could “validly
post his property against” union distribution if it “[did] not discriminate against the
union by allowing other distribution.”87 However, if employees were beyond the
reach of the union’s “reasonable attempts . . . to communicate,” the nonemployees
gained a right to access the employer’s property.88 Essentially, this means the NLRB
will not force employers to provide access to union representatives if they had any
reasonable alternative means of accessing the employees (the “Babcock standard”).
For nearly four decades the NLRB relied on the Babcock standard to analyze
such questions of access. However, the Supreme Court narrowed the already limited
Babcock standard for nonemployee access in its 1992 Lechmere v. NLRB decision.89
The rights union organizers enjoy through the Act are under further scrutiny as
courts struggle to uniformly apply Lechmere.90 These inconsistencies of lower court
decisions demand a new analysis that respects the policies promoted by the Act and
respects the role of state law in determining property rights.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The Act is the governing law for private sector labor policy in the United
States, and the NLRB administers the Act as an independent federal agency.91 The
NLRB has two essential functions: first, it conducts representation elections to
determine whether employees want to join a union; and second, it hears and

85

NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).

86

Id. at 112.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); infra Part III.B.
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See, e.g., Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008).
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29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (establishing that the NLRB administers the NLRA as an independent
agency).
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remedies unfair labor practice charges brought under the Act.92 The NLRB’s
General Counsel investigates and prosecutes unfair labor practice cases before the
NLRB for violations of the Act.93 Employees enjoy certain rights under § 7 of the
Act, including:
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.94
The Act protects against certain “unfair labor practices” committed by employers or
unions.95 Among the unfair labor practices, an employer commits a § 8(a)(1)
violation if it “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in § 7.”96
The battle over access to employer property for nonemployee union
representatives revolves around the above-mentioned provisions of the Act. When
an employee receives information regarding union membership, the employee is
exercising his or her § 7 rights.97 However, § 7 grants employees this right, so
nonemployee union representatives only have a “derivative right.”98 These derivative
rights are based on those rights granted to employees under § 7 but not explicitly
defined anywhere. Courts and the NLRB are therefore required to interpret the
scope of these derivative rights when they are claimed under the Act. A significant
amount of time is spent litigating the scope of nonemployees implied, derivative
rights under the Act.99
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National Labor Relations Board Fact Sheet, http://www.nlrb.gov/About_Us/Overview/
fact_sheet.aspx (last visited Sep. 1, 2010).
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Id.
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29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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Id. at §158(a)(1).
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Id. (commonly referred to as § 8(a)(1) from the original National Labor Relations Act).
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Id. at § 157.
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See infra Part III(C).
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Interpreting the scope of employee and nonemployee § 7 rights presents a
challenge, which is exacerbated because both the NLRB and the Supreme Court
have offered different interpretations of the Act. This conflict, created by the lack
of a single, unified interpretation of the Act, is problematic for courts and litigants.
The following cases demonstrate the back-and-forth struggle between courts and the
NLRB in attempting to define the limits of nonemployee rights to access employer
property.
B. The NLRB’s Interpretation of Babcock in Jean Country
The NLRB attempted to apply the Babcock balance of private property rights
and § 7 rights in Jean Country and Brook Shopping Centers, Inc.100 Jean Country involved
ideal conditions to explore the numerous issues percolating through the established
case law. Specifically, Jean Country addressed how to appropriately consider possible
alternative means of communication between nonemployee union representatives
and non-union employees.101 Brook Shopping Centers, Inc. (“Brook”) operated a
large shopping center in New York.102 Jean Country was a new clothing store
located in Brook’s mall.103 Although other Jean Country stores were unionized, the
store at issue was not.104 Gaetano Mangano, a union representative, and two other
retired union members began a picket line outside the non-unionized Jean Country
store to inform the public of the site’s non-union status.105 Subsequently, mall
officials notified Mangano that the picketers would be arrested for trespassing unless

100

Jean Country & Brook Shopping Centers Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).

101

In Fairmont Hotel Co., the NLRB initially announced a test balancing § 7 rights and property rights
that only considered alternative means of exercising those rights if the § 7 rights and property rights
were determined to be equal. Id. at 11 (citing Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 (1986)). In
Jean Country, the NLRB recognized that in post-Fairmont decisions, the availability of alternative means
of communication should always be considered in access cases. Id. (citing Browning’s Foodland Inc.,
284 N.L.R.B. 939 (1987); Sisters International Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 796 (1987)). Additionally, the
NLRB’s decision in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) suggested that the appropriate
alternative means of communication could depend on the nature and strength of the § 7 and property
rights asserted. Id. at 12.
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Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14.
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Id.
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Id.
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they moved to a public road beyond the mall property.106 Mangano then filed
charges alleging Brook and Jean Country violated § 8(a)(1).107
The NLRB embarked on a balancing of private property rights and § 7 rights
and found the appropriate analysis must also consider the alternative means of
communicating the union’s message.108 As the NLRB noted, Babcock held that the
importance of the “alternative means to communicate available to nonemployees”
depends on the strength of the property right asserted by the employer.109 The
NLRB attempted to formulate a standard that continued to consider alternative
means of communication when determining access rights a nonemployee enjoys.
This standard, however, opened the door for greater nonemployee access rights
because of the expansive classes of individuals the NLRB used to describe its rule.
Jean Country described discrimination against nonemployee access in general terms
when it concluded, “[A] property owner who has closed his property to
nonemployee communications, on a nondiscriminatory basis, cannot be required to
grant access where reasonable alternative means exist.”110 Although the NLRB
recognized that a strongly protected property right could overcome any access claims
maintained by unions, any access granted by the employer to nonemployees could
not make distinctions between nonemployee groups.111 Rather, the NLRB
recognized a broad dichotomy between employees and nonemployees.
The NLRB went on to find that Jean Country and Brook violated § 8(a)(1)
by stopping Mangano’s picketing efforts.112 First, the NLRB recognized that Jean
Country and Brook satisfied the threshold inquiry and had a real interest in the
property they claimed.113 Next, the NLRB determined the property interest at stake
was relatively weak because the mall was open to the public and allowed non
106

Id.

107

Id. As described in supra Part III.A, a § 8(a)(1) violation occurs when the employer interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
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commercial interests, such as photography exhibits, to use its space.114 Further, the
NLRB found there were no factors to suggest the claimed § 7 rights were worthy of
enhanced protection.115 Therefore, the NLRB’s final step required analyzing the
alternative means of communication.116
The NLRB determined the Union’s only legitimate alternative means to
communicate its message to customers of the Jean Country store was on a point of
public property adjacent to the entrances to the mall.117 While Jean Country and
Babcock argued that mass media communication was available to the picketers as an
alternative means of communication, the NLRB dismissed this idea because it would
remove the picketers’ message from the awareness of Jean Country customers as
they approached the store.118 Further, this alternative would have come at great cost
to the union in the New York City media market.119 Thus, the NLRB was left to
compare the union’s attempted means of communication with placing their
representatives on the public property adjacent to the mall’s private property to
communicate its message.
The NLRB was primarily concerned that forcing the picketers to move to
public property near one of the mall’s entrances would dilute their message.120 The
Jean Country store was one of over a hundred specialty shops centrally located on
private property and one-quarter mile from the nearest entrance next to public
property.121 The NLRB was not satisfied with this proposed alternative because it
would be less effective.122 The union’s message would not register as strongly with
potential “impulse shoppers” deciding to stop at Jean Country only while passing the
store if the union was forced to communicate its message at such a great distance.123

114

Id.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 18.
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Id.
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Id. at 18, n.18.
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Further, passersby might unintentionally confuse the union’s message as being
directed at neutral stores, or even the entire mall.124 The negative consequences of
following this alternative form of communication led the the NLRB to order Jean
Country and Brook to allow the union access to picket in front of the Jean Country
store.125
C. Lechmere “Clarifies” Babcock But Leads to Divergent Lower-Court Interpretations
The Supreme Court was not satisfied with the NLRB’s Jean Country opinion.
In Lechmere v. NLRB, the Supreme Court issued its watershed decision on
nonemployee access in NLRA-related situations.126 Members of the United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO attempted to organize workers at a store
owned by Lechmere, Inc.127 The union took out a full-page advertisement in the
local newspaper, passed out handbills to cars entering the parking lot, and recorded
the license plate numbers of employee cars to obtain their home contact
information.128 These efforts proved largely unsuccessful, but management
prevented the union from otherwise accessing the employees on the employer’s
property.129 The union filed charges alleging Lechmere violated the Act.130 The
NLRB ruled in the union’s favor, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that
decision.131
The Supreme Court clarified that nonemployee access rights to employer
property under the Act involves a two-layer analysis.132 First, for a nonemployee to
gain a right to access employer property the nonemployee must not have “reasonable
access” to the employees outside of the employer’s property.133 Second, where the

124

Id.
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Id. at 19.
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See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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nonemployee cannot reasonably access the employees outside of the employer’s
property, the NLRB should balance the employer’s private property rights with the
NLRA § 7 rights.134 When the Court applied this standard to the facts presented in
Lechmere, it dismissed the nonemployee union representative’s claimed right to access
the employer’s property under the first step.135 The Court cited the union’s
“success” in retrieving 20% of employees’ home addresses through license plate
numbers as evidence of the union’s ability to reasonably access employees.136
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by relying on a narrow
interpretation of the Babcock standard and its definition of reasonable access.137 The
Court explained that the NLRB failed to distinguish the rights of employees and
nonemployees under the Act when the NLRB granted nonemployees access to the
employer’s property.138 Because nonemployees only have derivative rights under the
Act, “an employer cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by
nonemployee organizers on his property,” subject to an exception.139 The court
established an exception, developed from dicta in Babcock, providing nonemployee
access to employer property “[w]here ‘the location of the plant and the living
quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union
efforts to communicate with them.”140 Only in this limited situation, where

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id. at 530, 540. In Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit interpreted the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25, to further restrain a union organizing
campaign’s ability to use license plate numbers in acquiring employee contact information. A union
collecting this information argued that it was in connection with a civil investigation proceeding to
investigate unlawful employment practices. Id. at 394-95. The Third Circuit found against the union
because it could not separate the permissible activity, investigating unlawful employment practices,
from the impermissible activity of using the information for union organizing. Id. at 394-96. Thus,
one of the few alternative reasonable means cited in Lechmere for nonemployee union representatives
to establish direct contact with employees while respecting the private property rights of the employer
was negated by federal legislation.
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See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532-41 (1992).
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Id. at 533-34. This analysis contrasts with the NLRB’s explanation, on remand, of the Babcock
accommodation balance in Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977). When the NLRB applied the
straight Babcock analysis in Hudgens, it rejected Hudgens’ argument that mass media provided an
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nonemployee union representatives had no reasonable access to communicate with
employees, could the NLRB compel an employer to allow nonemployees access to
the employer’s property.141 This exception effectively redefined “reasonable access”
to mean “ability to communicate by any possible means” with employees off of the
employer’s property, and it significantly undermined nonemployee efforts to reach
employees.
Although not recognized by the Lechmere Court, one can distinguish two
classes of property from the Lechmere analysis to evaluate nonemployee access rights:
private property and quasi-public property. Private property refers to an employer’s
property that is not open to nonemployees under any circumstances.142 The Court
maintained its previous holding from Babcock, at least in the context of private
property, that an employer can keep nonemployees off its premises for
organizational purposes if it does so in a uniform manner.143 In such a case, the
NLRB cannot compel an employer to allow nonemployees on its private property.144
Quasi-public property is that which an employer opens to the public in some
respect to do business. A town shopping mall is one example of quasi-public
property. Neither the NLRB nor courts have interpreted Lechmere uniformly when
dealing with cases where an employer’s property is open to nonemployee access in
some form. The Lechmere two-part analysis includes an implicit assumption that the

adequate, reasonable means of reaching the audience with its information. Id. at 416. Such a
perspective would “undercut NLRB and Court precedent recognizing and protecting such picketing
as the most effective way of reaching those who would enter a struck employer's premises, including
situations in which the entrance to the employer's property is on land owned by another.” Id. at 41617.
141

Id. at 539-40. As this description suggests, the Lechmere Court focused on whether nonemployees
could gain access to employer property where there was no reasonable means to communicate with
nonemployees. In reaching its conclusion, the Court quoted a passage from its Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters opinion, which suggested there might be another path to access rights where “the
employer’s access rules discriminate against union solicitation.” Id. at 535 (quoting Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978)). The Court did not directly address this alternative in
Lechmere.
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Though business related, nonemployee access is a limited exception to this definition.
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Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
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See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). The only exception to
this is where an employee lives on the employer’s property. In that unique case, the
employer must provide some access. Id. at 113.
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employer will have a right to exclude under state property law. This assumption has
led courts to confuse whether the employer’s right to exclude from its property
should be scrutinized as an initial matter. Thus, courts addressing nonemployee
union representative claims to access employer property under Lechmere are not sure
whether the threshold inquiry is the employer’s ability to exclude under state
property law or the Babcock exception cited in Lechmere.145
The Second Circuit followed the latter approach in Salmon Run Shopping Center
LLC v. NLRB.146 In Salmon Run, the union sought permission from the owners of a
large shopping mall to distribute materials outside of a store that was using nonunion carpenters to remodel their retail space.147 The mall eventually denied the
union’s requests, though it previously allowed requests for other unions conducting
charitable activity.148 The court acknowledged two exceptions to the Babcock
standard restricting rights to employer property: “where (1) the organizational
activity was directed at employees who are inaccessible through other means; and (2)
‘the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing
other distribution’” (the “inaccessibility exception” and the “discrimination
exception,” respectively). 149 The Second Circuit held that consideration of these two
exceptions (together the “Babcock exceptions” and each a “Babcock exception”) is a
threshold question explaining “[o]nly where the facts establish one of these two
exceptions” should the NLRB engage in a balance of § 7 and private property
rights.150 The court went on to define discrimination based on distinctions made on
§ 7 grounds and held the union had no right to access the mall property.151
The Ninth Circuit followed a starkly different approach in NLRB v.
Calkins.
There, a grocery store owner excluded nonemployee union
152
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In his proposed model discussed below, Hirsch begins by presuming these cases ask a
threshold question of whether the employer had a state property right to exclude
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representatives seeking to picket and distribute literature aimed at organizing the
store employees.153 The Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of the employer’s
state property right to exclude.154 Unlike in Salmon Run, the extent of the employer’s
right to exclude under state property law was the threshold issue for the Ninth
Circuit’s understanding of Lechmere.155 Applying this version of the Lechmere analysis,
the court found a narrow right to exclude the nonemployees under California law
because California incorporated its broad constitutional free speech protections into
property access rights.156 Therefore, the store owner violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by
excluding the nonemployees from the store property.157
D. Explaining and Resolving the Confusion Over Lechmere
The confusion over how to apply Lechmere is apparent but it is important to
understand the reasons for the differing opinions among the circuits to formulate a
better standard. One can understand why the circuits follow different approaches to
applying the Lechmere standard when that opinion is closely examined. First, Lechmere
expressly overruled the NLRB’s Jean Country opinion.158 In Jean Country, the NLRB
implemented a three-part balancing test that included private property rights and § 7
rights to determine nonemployees’ right to access employer property.159 In light of
the rejection of a balancing test that initially considers state property law, one could
infer that the NLRB should not begin to consider whether the employer has a statelaw right to exclude so soon in its analysis. Second, nowhere in the Lechmere opinion
did the court actually embark on a state-law analysis of the private property rights at
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Id. at 1087-88.
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Id. at 1089-93.
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Jean Country & Brook Shopping Centers Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988) (“[I]n all access
cases our essential concern will be the degree of impairment of the § 7 right if access should
be denied, as it balances against the degree of impairment of the private property right if
access should be granted. We view the consideration of the availability of reasonably
effective alternative means as especially significant in this balancing process.”).

154

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 12

issue.160 Rather, the Court presumed that nonemployees had no right to access the
employer’s property under state law. 161 The importance of state property rights was
undermined when the court assumed, without stating or supporting with authority,
that the employer maintained an absolute right to exclude nonemployees.
Despite these suggestions, convincing arguments exist that state property
rights are important and should be a controlling consideration to determine a
nonemployee’s access rights. First, an individual should not lose a right to access
property that he or she might otherwise enjoy simply because the purpose behind
their access is motivated by § 7 of the Act. As Calkins demonstrates, California
maintains broad access rights because that state, through its constitution, highly
regards freedom of speech.162 Restricting consideration of the nonemployee’s ability
to access employer property to a Babcock exception severely limits a nonemployee’s
right to access that he or she should otherwise enjoy.
Second, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on state property law in Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v. Reich, handed down shortly after Lechmere, also suggests that access rights
under state property law are a primary concern.163 In Thunder Basin, a mine owner
challenged the granting of miner representatives the right to accompany government
officials on safety and health inspections of mines pursuant to the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977.164 The Court denied the mine owner’s
claim that a miner representative could potentially abuse its access privileges and
subject the mine owner to serious harm.165 In its reasoning, the Court noted, “The
right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private property emanates
from state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the Act, nothing in
the Act expressly protects it.”166 Thus, a nonemployee’s right to access under state
law cannot be preempted by the Act and the application of the Babcock exceptions

160 In Lechmere the appropriate state property law to consider would have come from Connecticut.
The Ninth Circuit in Calkins analyzed Connecticut law when it distinguished the facts in Lechmere.
Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1088.
161

See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537-39.
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Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1089-93.
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should not restrict those rights.
The difference between each approach taken by courts and described above
is significant. The Second Circuit interpretation in Salmon Run (following the
Babcock/Lechmere framework) presents a narrow interpretation that makes it difficult
for nonemployees to ever hold access rights to employer property. A nonemployee
seeking to conduct § 7-related activity does not have the same right to access
property that is held open to the general public under the Salmon Run approach. The
nonemployee speaker must first classify their inability to access employer property
within a Babcock exception.167 Additionally, access is further narrowed for the § 7
speaker, because courts define discrimination narrowly to allow the employer to
exclude only those nonemployees addressing § 7 matters but not other nonemployee
speakers.168 However, under the second approach, which considers state property
rights first, like that in Calkins, the nonemployee has a greater chance of having a
lawful access interest in the property.169 The limited circumstances presented by the
Babcock exceptions no longer act as a filter before addressing state property law.
E. Fremont-Rideout Threatens to Require the NLRB to Apply a Narrow Definition of
Discrimination
Nonemployee union representatives’ access to employees on employer
property threatens to become even more limited due to recent NLRB decisions. In
Fremont-Rideout, an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) applied the NLRB’s
Register-Guard discrimination analysis170 to nonemployee union representative access
to employer property.171 If the NLRB accepts this analysis, it would significantly
curtail the remaining access to property rights for union representatives.
1.

Register-Guard

The NLRB created a new definition of discrimination in the context of
company property in Register-Guard when it considered an employee’s right to use its
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The Fremont-Rideout Health Group (Fremont-Rideout), 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20, at
*32 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 29, 2009).
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employer’s e-mail system for § 7 purposes.172 The NLRB relied on its precedent
concerning employer equipment to determine that an employee did not have a § 7
right to use Register-Guard’s e-mail system for union purposes.173 Register-Guard’s
restrictions on company e-mail were analogous to lawful employer restrictions on
bulletin boards, telephones, and televisions.174 Register-Guard’s property interest in
the e-mail system controlled, preventing employees from engaging in any § 7 activity,
regardless of the employees’ authorized presence at the workplace.175 Further, the
NLRB was not convinced that e-mails presented such a unique form of
communication that it had to modify its rules to deal with them.176
The truly remarkable part of the Register-Guard opinion came when the NLRB
addressed the definition of discrimination.177 Prior to Register-Guard, an employer
could exclude all non-work related material from a communication system but could
not discriminate between non-work related subjects, including union-related
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Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1118. The Register-Guard and Eugene Newspaper Guild published
a newspaper with the union representing its employees. In October 1996, Register-Guard
implemented a Communications Systems Policy (“CSP”) that prevented employees from using
Register-Guard’s communications systems and equipment to solicit for “outside organizations.” In
May and August 2000, management formally warned employee Suzi Prozanski for violating the CSP
by using the company’s e-mail system for union purposes. Register-Guard first warned Prozanski
following a May 4, 2000 e-mail, in which Prozanski informed employees that management created
rumors that anarchists would be attending a union rally. Register-Guard then later warned Prozanski
for violating the CSP following two August 2000 e-mails urging employees to wear green in support
of the union during negotiations and asking employees to participate in the union’s entry in a town
parade. Unlike Prozanski’s first e-mail, she did not use any physical company property or work time
to communicate with Register-Guard employees through these August e-mails. Prozanski sent these
e-mails from a union computer, but she sent the e-mails to the employees’ Register-Guard e-mail
addresses. Id. at 1111-12.
173

Id. at 1116.

174

Id. at 1114 (citing Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000) (television for
campaign video), enforced, 348 U.S. App. D.C. 75, 269 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Eaton Techs., Inc.,
322 N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997) (bulletin board); Champion Int’l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109 (1991)
(copy machine); Churchill’s Supermarkets, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 138, 155 (1987) (telephone), enforced 857
F.2d 1474 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1046 (1989)).
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Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1115-16.
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Id.

177

See id. 1116-19.
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matters.178 In Register-Guard, the NLRB followed the Seventh Circuit’s approach and
applied an entirely new definition of discrimination: “[D]iscrimination means the
unequal treatment of equals. Thus, in order to be unlawful, discrimination must be
along § 7 lines. In other words, unlawful discrimination consists of disparate
treatment of activities or communications of a similar character because of their
union or other § 7-protected status.”179
This narrow construction of
“discrimination” significantly narrowed when an employer might be found to
unlawfully distinguish between access rights.
2.

Fremont-Rideout

In Fremont-Rideout, an ALJ applied the Register-Guard discrimination analysis to
nonemployee access to property.180 The California Nurses Association (“CNA”)
became the collective bargaining representative of the nurses at the Fremont-Rideout
Health Group’s hospital facilities in California in September 2006, and subsequently
began collective bargaining for a contract in December 2006.181 Prior to the nurses
electing CNA as their representative, a Fremont-Rideout policy prohibited
employees from soliciting or distributing literature during work hours, or soliticiting
or distributing at any time in working or patient care areas.182 Despite this policy,
Fremont-Rideout allowed nurses to regularly visit with family and friends in the
break room, to solicit other nurses to purchase goods, and to bring in information

178

Benteler Indus., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 712, 714 (1997).

179

Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117-18. The NLRB found that Register-Guard did not violate
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by warning Prozanski after her August 14 and 18 e-mails. Although employees
were allowed to exchange personal e-mails on the Register-Guard system, this distinction was not
important under the NLRB’s new definition. Register-Guard did not discriminate on § 7 grounds
because there was no evidence that the company permitted employees to solicit for other groups or
organizations. Ironically, the NLRB found that Register-Guard violated § 8(a)(1) when it warned
Prozanski following her May 4 e-mail because that e-mail was not soliciting employees. The NLRB
noted that Register-Guard’s CSP prohibited only “non-job-related solicitations.” However, the
NLRB was unable to distinguish Prozanski’s non-solicitous, union-related e-mail from other
permitted nonwork related e-mails. Therefore, Register-Guard unlawfully discriminated along § 7
lines and violated §8(a)(1) when it warned Prozanski after her May 4 e-mail. Id. at 1119.
180

The Fremont-Rideout Health Group (Fremont-Rideout), 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20, at *31-34
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 29, 2009).
181

Id. at *4.

182

Id. at *5-6.
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concerning school fundraisers.183 Thus, while Fremont-Rideout had a policy against
solicitation and distribution, that policy was not consistently enforced.184
Fremont-Rideout even allowed nonemployee labor representatives to flout
these policies.185 CNA labor organizers and representatives routinely met with
nurses in break rooms and other areas of the hospitals.186 Not only did these CNA
representatives pass by nursing supervisors during their visits without problems, but
in certain areas CNA employees even “buzzed in” these individuals to the intensive
care unit.187 After CNA was elected to represent Fremont-Rideout’s nurses,
however, the hospital began to strictly enforce its no solicitation or distribution
policy against union representatives.188
In Fremont-Rideout, the ALJ applied the new Register-Guard definition of
discrimination to nonemployee access.189 Carrying this precedent over to the real
property access context, the ALJ held this same standard applied to nonemployees’
attempts to enter employer property.190 Although the employer allowed access to
hospital areas to family and friends of nurses, it did not have to allow access to union
representatives under the new definition of discrimination.191 The family and friends
Fremont-Rideout allowed to access the hospital were not similar to the CNA

183

Id. at *7.

184

Id.

185

Id. at *26-31.

186

Id.

187

Id. at *25-26.

188

Id. at *26-31.

189

Id. at *31-34. The Register-Guard court specifically noted that whether Lechmere could apply
to Prozanski was not an issue considered by the NLRB. Id. at 1119, n.25.

190

Id. at *32. The judge in Fremont-Rideout did not address several important distinctions with
Register-Guard. For example, the NLRB in Register-Guard applied its employer equipment
analysis rather than its employer real property analysis. Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114.
Additionally, the NLRB noted that the situation in Register-Guard still afforded employees the
ability to communicate face-to-face regarding § 7 protected topics. Id. at 1115. In contrast,
Fremont-Rideout involved real property and there was no alternative face-to-face
communication possible on the employer’s property.
191

Id. at *33-34.
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representatives, so Fremont-Rideout did not deny the nurses their § 7 rights.192 The
nurses and CNA representatives were, therefore, left without recourse as the Act did
not protect their access.
If accepted by the NLRB, this discrimination standard threatens to
substantially narrow the opportunities nonemployee union representatives have to
access employees on employer property. Lechmere may be limited to the issue it
stated it was addressing: “Babcock’s inaccessibility exception.”193 By narrowly framing
its review to that sole issue, Lechmere suggests it was not considering Babcock’s
discrimination exception, where the employer discriminates specifically against union
distribution or solicitation.194 Fremont-Rideout narrows this exception by defining
discrimination so that an employer can allow solicitation and distribution by outside
groups on non-union matters, but not those groups concerned with § 7 rights.195
Furthermore, the employer maintains the right to hold captive audience meetings,
which are typically held on the employer’s property in the absence of non
employees.196 The employer, thus, can both exclude all outside pro-union viewpoints
and promote a vigorous anti-union campaign without violating Lechmere.
IV.

HIRSCH’S PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE STATE PROPERTY LAW FROM THE
ANALYSIS

America has a longstanding policy seeking to grant equality to unions at the
bargaining table, but it is no longer effective. As demonstrated above, the ability for
nonemployee union representatives to access employer property is lessening. If
Labor advocates want to return unions membership to a significant population of
the workforce, they must advocate for change. Professor Hirsch proposed one
reform: eliminating state property law from the NLRB’s analysis of nonemployee

192

Id.

193

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992).

194

NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978) (“To gain access, the union has the burden of showing that no
other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the employees exists or that
the employer’s access rules discriminate against union solicitation.”).

195

See The Fremont-Rideout Health Group (Fremont-Rideout), 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20, at *33-34
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 29, 2009).

196

See id.
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access to employer property.197 Rather than seeking to eliminate state property rights
from the NLRB’s consideration, pro-union advocates should embrace state property
law as a means of expanding nonemployee access to employer property.
A. Hirsch’s Proposed Analysis for Nonemployee Access to Employer Property
Hirsch contends that the NLRB lacks the expertise to properly scrutinize
property rights in all fifty states and provides convincing examples of where this
problem has been evident in past opinions.198 Requiring the NLRB to engage in this
sort of analysis has left employers and employees alike uncertain over how the
NLRB’s precedent might apply.199
Hirsch’s approach would relieve the NLRB of this burden and instead
consider the manner in which an employer excludes § 7 activity.200 Hirsch argues
that a peaceful request by an employer to nonemployee organizers to leave its
property should establish a rebuttable presumption of lawful behavior.201
Furthermore, any employer actions beyond a peaceful request are presumed to be
coercive, unlawful activity under the Act.202 Under this model, any common law
claims, such as trespass, would be left for state courts to decide under a separate
action.203
While Hirsch presents a creative alternative to current NLRB policy, his
proposal has two significant flaws. First, deciding whether an employer violates §
8(a)(1) based on the manner in which the employer requests union organizers to
leave its property is susceptible to routinely becoming a battle of “he said, she said.”
Presumably, disputes will often center on the union’s version of the employer’s
actions versus the employer’s version. Hirsch’s model lacks an objective basis that a
fact-finder can refer to in making its decision. By focusing on property rights, the
NLRB can examine objective evidence to determine what rights the parties enjoyed,

197

Hirsch, supra note 2.

198

Id. at 909-15.

199

Id. at 893-94.

200

Id. at 892.
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Id. at 918-19.
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Id.
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Id. at 919.

2010]

LISTEN TO YOUR STATE

161

regardless of what was said.
Second, while Hirsch’s proposal may make dispute resolution easier from the
NLRB’s perspective, it fails to make the process any smoother for the parties who
raise a dispute. Although Hirsch addresses potential NLRA preemption concerns,204
the NLRB should take a greater interest in the parties it serves. By requiring an
employer’s trespass claims to be resolved in state courts, Hirsch’s plan inevitably
leaves the employer and union to handle two cases at once. Requiring the parties to
litigate twice only complicates and increases the costs of proceedings. In other areas
of employment law, however, Hirsch noted the disadvantages of any approach that
opens the possibility of parties adjudicating their claims in two different forums.205
Further, this process unnecessarily creates twice the amount of work for courts,
already strained institutions. Although Hirsch seeks to simplify the Lechmere analysis
by subtracting property rights that vary across jurisdictions, the better approach is to
set a uniform standard for those property rights when they are analyzed by the
NLRB.
B. Avenues of Access: State Sources that Impact Private Property Rights
Rather than supporting the removal of state property law from nonemployee
access analysis, Labor advocates who want to see an increase in union membership
should endorse the use of state property law to determine nonemployee access rights
to employer property. State laws currently control the access and exclusion rights
associated with property in three forms: (1) constitutions, (2) statutes, and (3)
common law. Currently, few states recognize nonemployee access rights through
these forms of law. However, closer examination of each of these bases of law
reveals opportunities for Labor to utilize and expand upon nonemployee union
representative access rights to employer property. Successful union efforts to
influence state law on other related matters provide a strong basis of support for
seeking change for nonemployee access to employer property at this legislative level.
1.

State Constitutions

Some states interpret their constitutions to allow for more expansive rights

204
205

Id. at 935-40.

Paul M. Secunda & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Debate: Workplace Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 28, 38-39 (2008) (Hirsch argues against states limiting captive audience speeches by
statute because it further complicates the adjudicatory process that is best left in the NLRB alone).
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of access to private property.206 While the Supreme Court eliminated the possibility
of a First Amendment basis in the federal constitution for accessing private
property,207 the Court acknowledged elsewhere that state constitutions can be
interpreted to provide more expansive access rights.208 States finding a right to
access private property through their respective state constitutions generally look to
free speech rights as the basis for analysis.209 The states acknowledging a state
constitutional right to access private property can be divided based on whether they
require state action.
Colorado found its state constitution grants individuals a right to access
private property, but requires some form of state action for an individual to claim
free speech protection. In Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the free speech article of the Colorado Constitution granted individual
members of a political association the right to distribute pamphlets and solicit
signatures in common areas of a local mall.210 Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado

206

While this section discusses those states that have allowed individuals to access private property
through their state constitutions, a number of state courts have outright denied such rights in their
respective state constitutions. These decisions include Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm.,
767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984);
Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc. v. Gwinett Place Assoc., L.P., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1990); State v.
Viglielmo, 95 P.3d 952 (Haw. 2004); City of West Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa
2002); Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 341 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d en banc, 378
N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); State
v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1981); Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994); W.
Penn. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 485 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984),
aff’d, 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986); Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. 1992);
Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987).
207

Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976).

208

Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“Our reasoning . . . does not ex proprio
vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution.”).

209 See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (finding that
Washington’s constitutional free speech protections prevented mall owners from stopping a political
group from soliciting signatures or demonstrating in support of “Initiative 383”). But see Southcenter
Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wash. 1989) (limiting
Alderwood to soliciting signatures under the initiative provision of the Washington constitution).
210

Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 63 (Colo. 1991).
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Constitution provides that “every person shall be free to speak, write or publish
whatever he will on any subject.”211 Colorado’s free speech rights protected the
individuals distributing and soliciting in the mall because of “an affirmative
acknowledgement of the liberty of speech” and a long tradition in broad speech
protection.212 To reach this conclusion, the court found sufficient government
involvement through the City’s financing of street and drainage systems adjacent to
the mall; a police substation in the mall; and Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
recruiting offices maintained in the mall.213
Other state supreme courts hold their state constitutions grant individuals the
right to access private property without a state action requirement. The California
Supreme Court famously found a right to access private property that was later
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.214
In PruneYard, security guards at the PruneYard Shopping Center stopped a group of
high school students from soliciting support to oppose a United Nations
resolution.215 Relying on the free speech provisions of Article I, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, the PruneYard court determined the students had a right to
access the privately owned shopping mall to convey their message.216 The PruneYard
court analogized the students’ rights to encroachments on private property interests
that result from public interests in zoning laws, environmental needs and other
concerns.217 The court summarized, “As the interest of society justifies restraints
upon individual conduct, so also does it justify restraints upon the use to which
property may be devoted.”218 The strong interest in free speech rights led the court
to justify the students’ right of access to the private property.219
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Colo. Const. Art. II, § 10.

212

Bock, 819 P.2d at 59-60.

213

Id. at 61.

214

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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Id. at 902.

216

Id. at 910-11. The California Supreme Court also concluded that Article I, Section 3 of the state
constitution provided a right to access the property to petition.
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Id. at 906.
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Id.
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See id.
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Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court found a right for individuals to
distribute leaflets at a shopping center through the expansive free speech guarantees
of its state constitution.220 The Massachusetts Supreme Court also found an
individual had the right to solicit signatures at a shopping mall pursuant to Article IX
of the Massachusetts Constitution, which concerned equality to elect and be
elected221 because no state action was required under that provision.222
While these state constitution cases deal with shopping malls as the setting of
private property,223 the fundamental aspects of this type of property parallel other
forms of private property that may be the target of union efforts to organize. The
property in the shopping mall cases is owned by a private individual or entity.
Additionally, both shopping malls and the properties discussed in the
aforementioned union access cases restrict access to certain individuals, like solicitors
and union representatives, but allow others. Like a mall that places few restrictions
on who may enter, the hospital in Fremont-Rideout allowed friends and family

220

N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 770-79 (N.J.
1994). The court strongly emphasized that this ruling was “limited to leafleting at such centers, and it
applies nowhere else.” Id. at 760. The New Jersey Constitution states, “Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.” N.J. Const., Art. I,
Para. 6.
221

At one time, Oregon similarly reasoned that an individual could access private property through
the initiative and referendum clauses of the Oregon Constitution. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d
446 (Or. 1992). However, this decision was later reversed and such rights were denied under the state
constitution. Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228 (Or. 2000). Similarly, Washington granted a
right to access private property but then later reversed its decision. See Alderwood Assocs., v. Wash.
Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981); Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy
Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wash. 1989).
222

Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 592-96 (Mass. 1983). The Massachusetts
Court noted that it was not addressing the individual’s right to access private property under the state
constitution’s freedom of speech provision. However, as the Batchelder court noted with the freedom
and equality of elections provision, the Massachusetts free speech clause does not refer to the state in
granting its protections. Rather, it states, “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free
speech shall not be abridged.” Mass. Const. Pt. 1, Art. XVI. Therefore, it seems there is a strong
argument that a similar analysis would apply if the right to access private property rested on the free
speech clause of the Massachusetts constitution.
223

Although local governments may play a role in building shopping centers, these properties are
largely considered to be private.
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members to visit as they pleased.224 Further, the ability to communicate the message
with the targeted audience is significantly stronger when access to the private
property is granted. In the case of shopping malls, the intended audience is the
general public that collectively gathers to engage in commercial activity.
2.

State Statutes and Regulations

State statutes and regulations represent another form of state law that can
allow individuals access to private property. Exceptions provided by state law to
common law trespass claims provide a good example. In some contexts, state laws
grant an individual on another person’s property a privilege from any common law
trespass claims.225 At common law, trespass was “an invasion (a) which interfered
with the right of exclusive possession of the land, and (b) which was a direct result of
some act committed by the defendant.”226 Today, common law trespass includes a
defendant’s “misfeasance, transgression, or offense that damages another’s person,
health reputation or property.”227 However, a legislative duty or authority can be
placed on an individual to grant that person a privilege to access private property.228
Therefore, a common law trespass action itself may be defeated by state legislation
or regulation.
For instance, in Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Dept. of Public Health, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed whether an employer’s claims of a right to
exclude others could be defeated by individuals seeking to access the property to

224

See The Fremont-Rideout Health Group (Fremont-Rideout), 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20, at *6, *31
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 29, 2009).

225

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 211.

226

Powell on Real Property, § 64A.01[2] (citing W. Prosser and W. Keeton on Torts, § 13 at 67 (5th
ed. 1984)).

227

Id. at § 64A.01[3].

228

Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that:
A duty or authority imposed or created by legislative enactment carries with it the
privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose of performing
or exercising such duty or authority in so far as the entry is reasonably necessary to
such performance or exercise, if, but only if, all the requirements of the enactment
are fulfilled.

Section 329 defines a trespasser as “a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor’s consent or otherwise.”
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speak with employees pursuant to the state’s department of public health’s
regulations.229 Massachusetts law granted the department the ability to enact
regulations addressing educational and recreational opportunities available to migrant
workers.230 Pursuant to this law, the department’s regulations granted migrant
workers at farm labor camps “reasonable rights of visitation.”231 These rights
included receiving visitors during non-working hours.232 However, the employer
denied entry to a non-profit organization employee and a church chaplain seeking to
speak with migrant worker under these regulations.233
The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that these regulations did not
unconstitutionally infringe on the employer’s right to exclude others from its private
property.234 In rejecting the employer’s claims, the court noted that “the enjoyment
of private property may be subordinated to reasonable regulations that are essential
to the peace, safety, and welfare of the community.”235 The court found the
regulations were reasonable because they were (1) rationally related to promoting the
public health and welfare and (2) reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose.236
Therefore, the department of health’s regulations successfully overcame the
employer’s private property right to exclude others.237
3.

State Common Law

Finally, courts also overcome the right to exclude from private property by
creating common law exceptions. The New Jersey Supreme Court utilized this
approach in New Jersey v. Shack.238 In this case, employees from nonprofit
organizations providing legal and health services for migrant farm workers attempted

229

Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Dept. of Public Health, 364 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass. 1977)
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Id. at 1204 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 128H (1971)).
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Id. at 1205, n.4.
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Id.
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Id. at 1205.
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Id. at 1207.
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Id. (citing Durgin v. Minot, 89 N.E. 144, 146 (Mass. 1909)).
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Id. at 1208.
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New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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to visit a farm employee living on the employer’s property to administer medical
aid.239 The employer, however, would only allow these individuals to see the
employee in the employer’s office with the employer present.240 After the social
services workers rejected the employer’s visitation terms and refused to leave the
premises until they could see the employee in private, the employer executed a
formal complaint for violation of the state’s trespass statute, and the individuals were
convicted of trespassing.241
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the defendants’ conviction for
trespassing after balancing the policies behind private property rights and the state’s
interest in promoting the welfare of migrant farm workers.242 The court found a
strong state interest in assisting migrant farm workers, evidenced by the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964.243 The court recognized the “unorganized” status of
migrant farm workers, which contributed to their economic and political
powerlessness.244 The right to access the migrant farm worker was further supported
by the importance of communication in rendering the appropriate aid.245 Notably,
the court cited a government report that identified “the lack of adequate direct
information” regarding the availability of public services as a significant problem
facing migrant farm workers.246 On the other hand, the court found a weak interest
in maintaining the employer’s absolute right to exclude from its property those
individuals seeking to aid the migrant farm worker.247 Further, the court found
property rights are weakened where there is a strong societal interest at stake.248
Thus, the court relied on a common law exception, preventing an individual from
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Id. at 370.
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Id.
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Id. at 370-71.
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Id. at 372-75.
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using his property “to injure the rights of others,”249 to provide the public service
third parties access rights to the employer’s property.250
Balancing these factors, the court concluded that the employer’s private
property right had to accommodate the state’s interest in providing for the welfare of
the migrant farm worker by allowing the social services employees to access the
employer’s property and privately visit the farm worker.251 Therefore, the employer
suffered no illegal invasion of his private property interest.252 The court, however,
went to great lengths to explain that the employer retained its right to provide
reasonable limitations to that access.253 The employer could continue to deny access
to outside individuals if the employer was not depriving the migrant worker of
“practical access to things he needs” or place restrictions on visitors such as
requiring an individual seeking access to identify him or herself.254
Similarities exist between the nonemployee union representative’s attempts
to access unorganized employees on employer property and the nonemployee’s
efforts to access the migrant farm worker in Shack. First, the court noted that the
unorganized status of migrant farm workers contributed to their economically and
politically disadvantageous position.255 Similarly, unorganized employees may be in
an economically disadvantageous position compared to those employees who belong
to a union. Second, the court noted that communication was the key to the farm
workers realizing their opportunities under the law.256 Without allowing access to the
migrant farm workers in Shack, that message was crippled. Although the migrant
farm worker in Shack lived on the employer’s property, the argument continues to
apply in the case of employees who do not live on employer property. The
workplace provides a collective meeting point and a forum, which otherwise does
not exist, to communicate with a targeted audience. Nonemployee union
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representatives faced with the inability to address employees on employer property
are forced to dilute their message because they are not able to effectively
communicate with those employees.
4.

A Window of Opportunity for Expanded Access Rights

These three sources of state law authority (state constitutions, state statutes
and regulations, and state common law) demonstrate that pro-Labor groups seeking
to expand union membership should not shy away from relying on state property law
to grant access for nonemployee union representatives. In each instance, there are
opportunities where greater access rights can be realized than those available under
federal law. These opportunities demonstrate that Labor should not seek to
eliminate state property law from consideration of nonemployee access rights to
employer property as Hirsch advocates.
Returning the focus to state property rights also makes this issue one
controlled by local government and allows labor advocates greater opportunities for
persuading local lawmakers to expand access rights than they might experience in
dealing with federal legislators. For example, the labor movement has witnessed a
growing movement in certain parts of the country to end captive audience meetings
held by employers on employer property.257 In recent years, Connecticut and
Oregon considered legislation to ensure employers cannot take adverse employment
actions against employees who choose to walk away from these meetings.258 The
success of passing this legislation in Oregon259 demonstrates that labor advocates can
have greater success influencing access rights on quasi-public property in a state-bystate effort than in attempting to influence national legislation.
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RESTORING BALANCE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S BALANCING TEST AND
ENACTING THE LABOR RIGHTS ACT OF 2010

If Labor advocates want to succeed in restoring union membership ranks to
previous levels, they should turn their attention to emphasizing state property law’s
influence on the Act. This article suggests a two-pronged approach. First, contrary
to Hirsch’s proposal, the Supreme Court should bring state property rights to the
forefront of the Lechmere analysis and not treat the Babcock exceptions as exhaustive.
Second, Congress should prohibit private property owners that hold their property
open to the public from discriminating on the basis of labor viewpoints. Each of
these proposals addresses the mistakes of the current Lechmere analysis. Additionally,
each proposal supports the other in its attempt to reform the Act.
A. Returning Balance to Lechmere
The Supreme Court must address the shortcomings of Lechmere by
determining that nonemployee access analysis begins with analyzing one’s property
right to exclude that exists under relevant state law. In numerous jurisdictions, state
courts have found public access rights to private property under state law.260 By
requiring the NLRB to analyze state property rights first, individuals addressing labor
matters will no longer be treated as second-class citizens because of the content of
their speech. Further, the Court should relegate the Babcock exception to the
situation where it was originally intended to apply: where access to private property is
prohibited to all nonemployees. By approaching the analysis in this manner, the
nonemployee access precedent will remain intact.
Any rights granted to access private property must be grounded in state law
because the First Amendment does not grant a federal right to exercise an
individual’s freedom of speech on private property.261 Although Hirsch suggests it is
too difficult to ask the Board to analyze state property law, he overstates the
challenges the Board will face. Many jurisdictions have a long line of precedent
addressing whether their state’s constitutions, statutes, regulations, and common laws
afford access rights to private property.262 As demonstrated above, some
jurisdictions grant access rights through state constitutional provisions, while others
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allow the general public no such right. Even though Hirsch cites several striking
examples demonstrating the possible complexities of state property law,263 the low
frequency of these cases does not justify a conclusion that the NLRB is unable to
analyze state property law. Hirsch attempts to demonstrate the NLRB’s problems in
analyzing these cases by noting that it takes “substantially longer” to decide Lechmere
cases compared to all other NLRB cases.264 But the NLRB infrequently hears
Lechmere cases – exceedingly complex state property law claims – as evidenced in the
data Hirsch cites to support his proposal. For example, in 2002 the NLRB heard
only one Lechmere case.265 Thus, while the NLRB may occasionally be forced to work
with state law that does not always provide absolute clarity, these types of cases are
rare.
The Second Circuit interpreted Lechmere to require that the accommodation
analysis between state property law and § 7 rights take place only if the Babcock
exception applies.266 But this approach does not afford a citizen speaking on labor
issues equal protection of the law. Outside of the union context, nonemployee
individuals are given solicitation access without having to overcome the obstacles in
the Lechmere/Babcock framework. For example, in California an individual who seeks
to engage others on international politics in a public shopping mall is likely to be
afforded the right to do so, because California’s state constitution provides broad
freedom of speech rights on private property.267 But that same individual, speaking
on labor matters affecting one of the store’s employees, is unlikely to receive similar
protections under the Lechmere analysis.268 Assuming the mall enacts some sort of
no-solicitation policy, the NLRB would likely deny mall access to these speakers and
relegate their access to alternatives like public spaces adjacent to the mall parking
lot.269
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B. The Labor Rights Act of 2010
While the Supreme Court awaits the opportunity to clarify the Lechmere
analysis, Labor advocates who want to see union membership grow should push
Congress to enact what I would call the Labor Rights Act of 2010 (LRA). The LRA
would address the problem courts and the NLRB confront in the absence of a
uniform definition of “discriminate” as it applies to labor viewpoint access to
property. The text of the LRA would read:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
of any place of public accommodation, as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
2000a(b),270 without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
expressing labor, employee organization, or collective bargaining
viewpoints.
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the LRA would grant individuals seeking
to solicit information or distribute materials regarding labor issues equal access to
forums that are otherwise afforded to non-labor speakers. Title II of the Civil Rights
Act states “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race
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42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006) defining public accommodation as:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not
more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the
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establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of
which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
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color, religion, or national origin.”271 The LRA will simply substitute the language
addressing “race, color, religion, or national origin” with “labor, employee
organization, or collective bargaining viewpoints.” By enacting this legislation,
Congress will level the playing field so that if an individual opens his or her property
to nonemployees to conduct non-labor activity, such as soliciting charitable
donations, then nonemployees conducting similar labor activity will be afforded
comparable rights.
The LRA is likely to withstand any constitutional challenges because of the
Court’s precedent in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.272 In Heart of Atlanta, an
Atlanta, Georgia hotel operator challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.273 The Court upheld the law as a legitimate use of Congress’ Commerce
Clause power.274 Similarly, the LRA will be supported by Congress’ lawful exercise
of the Commerce Clause power. The consistency of the language incorporated in
the law will be undeniable. The words of the LRA are almost identical to the
approved language in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Further, any employer’s labor
force has an even greater direct tie to interstate commerce than the hotel room
transactions at issue in Heart of Atlanta. The justifications for Congress’ use of its
Commerce Clause power in passing the NLRA275 would likewise apply to support
passage of the LRA.
Not only would the LRA help bring balance to the union debate, but it
supports America’s labor policy enacted long ago in the NLRA. The LRA would
support Labor advocates’ goal of a strong middle class. Labor advocates can stand
behind the LRA to convince Americans of the position that a strong labor
movement is important to our country’s economy. By enacting the LRA, Congress
will send a clear message that labor viewpoints share the same protection as any
other speech.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Congress has identified a problem with the current state of unionization in
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the United States and has proposed reform efforts designed to increase union
participation through the EFCA. However, this is an inadequate solution for Labor
advocates because it does not address nonemployee access to employer property.
The focus of this analysis should be state property rights. As a short-term answer to
the property access debate for Labor advocates, courts should approach the Lechmere
analysis by looking at state property rights as a threshold inquiry. As a long-term
solution to this debate, Labor advocates should ask Congress to enact the LRA.
Through both of these measures, Labor advocates and union members can return to
a position of significance in America.

